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This dissertation studies the effect of political stability on health outcomes and expenditure in 
the SADC region. The health outcomes under investigation are life expectancy at birth, maternal 
mortality ratio, infant mortality rate and HIV incidence. Health expenditure is captured as the 
percentage of total government expenditure that is allocated to public health. The study 
conducts a literature review on previous studies that examine these relationships, conduct 
exploratory data analysis and conduct empirical estimations using two measures of political 
stability: International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk Services index and the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicator index. Additionally, further investigation is made into the effect that 
a country’s level of democracy has on health outcomes and public health expenditure. The 
empirical estimations involve a panel dataset containing 11 SADC countries over a 20 year 
period from 1996 to 2015. The results confirm the statistical and economic significance of 
political stability on all the health outcomes under investigation and on public health expenditure 
when controlling for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Holding all else constant, a one point increase in the political stability variable is associated with 
an increase of 0.19% for life expectancy, a decrease of 1.39% in maternal mortality, a decrease 
of 2.01% in infant mortality, an increase in HIV incidence of 3.48% and an increase in public 
health expenditure of 2.03%, when using the International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk 
Services index (ICRG). Political instability in the SADC region is characterized by destruction of 
social infrastructure including hospitals and roads in Angola and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and lack of resources for adequate healthcare in countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia 
and Malawi. Both mechanisms result in poor health outcomes in a given country in the region. 
Subsequently, countries like South Africa receiving refugees from politically unstable countries 
in the region also suffer from an overload on their health system which means resources 
allocated to the health sector are no longer adequate to meet the increased demand. When 
using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WB), holding all else constant, infant 
mortality decreases by 0.27% and HIV incidence increases by 0.40% when political stability 
increases by one point. The policy recommendation is to ensure strategic governance is in 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Since the independence of African countries began in the 1960s, many African regions have 
experienced political instability in the form of political alternation, ethnic conflicts, tribalism, wars, 
coup d’états and subsequent economic crises. The Encyclopedia defines political instability in 
three ways. The first approach defines it as the propensity for regime or government change. 
The second focuses on the incidence of political upheaval or violence in a community, such as 
assassinations, demonstrations, etc. The third approach focuses on instability in policies rather 
than instability in regimes (i.e., the degree to which fundamental policies of, for instance, land or 
property rights are subject to frequent changes). 
 
These crises have an impact on the economic outcomes of these countries and their associated 
health systems. The 1990s saw the introduction of democratic regimes across Africa, but the 
region still has the lowest rates of access to safe water and the highest rates of infant and 
under-five mortality in the world (WHO 2015; World Bank 2014).  
 
Figure 1.1 World Map depicting Under-five mortality rates by country 
 
                                                                                                                        Source: WHO, 2015 
The map above shows that Africa has the highest under-five mortality rates with a significant 





Health is an intrinsic human right as well as a central input to poverty reduction and socio-
economic development. In many developing countries, though cost-effective interventions are 
designed to control major diseases, inefficiency observed in the health sector combined with 
income poverty and political fragility hamper many of the poor’s efforts to access basic health 
services. Therefore, the high burden of preventable diseases in poor communities calls for 
strategic planning of investments across health and health-related sectors to improve the lives 
of poor people and promote sustainable and inclusive development. Many academics have 
expressed concern that economic downturn adversely affects public health as a result of job 
losses (Ruhm, 2004 and 2006, Dupas and Robinson, 2012). This not only creates additional 
social problems such as mental health problems, due to stress and anxiety that arise from 
unemployment, but also adoption of less healthy lifestyles that involve the consumption of less 
food than the required daily intake or cheap food with little nutritional value (Bhattacharya et al., 
2003; Maccini and Yang, 2009).  
 
However, an interesting but not fully explored relationship is that between public health and 
political instability. War torn countries experience deaths and poor health conditions due to 
active violence that kills people and destroys infrastructure. Of the 15 countries with the highest 
neonatal mortality rates in the world, all but Lesotho have been plagued by chronic civil conflict 
and political instability (Wise et al, 2015). Of the nine countries which account for the highest 
absolute numbers of neonatal deaths in the world, four (Nigeria, Pakistan, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Angola) are similarly characterised by political instability and 
governance. Estimates show that countries experiencing chronic conflict or political instability 
account for approximately 42% of all neonatal deaths worldwide (UNICEF, 2014). For example, 
with a still-birth rate of 39 per 1000 births, Zimbabwe is comparable to Afghanistan (36) and 













Figure 1.2 World Map depicting maternal mortality ratios by country 
 
                                                                                                                        Source: WHO, 2015 
 
The map above shows that Africa has the highest maternal mortality ratios with a significant 
portion having mortality rates of above 300 per 100 000 live births. Zimbabwe’s maternal 
mortality ratio is comparable to that of Angola and Congo- Brazzaville (World Bank, 2015) 
despite the presence of wars in the latter countries.  Despite considerable improvements in 
reproductive and newborn health throughout the world, relatively poor outcomes persist in areas 
plagued by conflict or political instability.  
 
However, most of the analyses between socio-political disorder, economic decline and mortality 
have taken place in the developed countries. Despite the disruption to civility in developing 
countries associated with political disorder, similar studies have not been extensively pursued in 
these regions (Ityavyar 1989, Pedersen 2002). Efforts to address adverse health outcomes in 
politically unstable areas should adapt recommended intervention protocols that target a better 
governance structure. This shall induce long-term stability and socio-economic development, 
which should help to pull people out of poverty and marginalization.  
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an interesting region to investigate 




diversity of political instability cases in the region. My familiarity with the region and its health 
statistics in comparison to countries with civil conflict also motivated the choice. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The main question to be answered in this study is whether a political system does affect 
performances of the health sector.  The SADC region is used as an example to answer this 
question. Specifically this thesis attempts to answer the following questions. 
 
1. What is the effect of political instability on health outcomes (life expectancy, maternal 
and child mortality and HIV incidence)?  
2. What is the effect of political instability on public health expenditure?  
 
1.3 Hypotheses to be tested 
1. Political instability negatively affects health outcomes 
2. Political instability reduces public health expenditure 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
 
This thesis is structured in four chapters, beyond the general introduction and the final 
conclusion. Chapter 2 gives the socio-political context of the SADC region. Chapter 3 looks at 
the literature describing politics in the SADC region. It also assesses the mechanisms by which 
political stability (instability) affects the health system. This includes a conceptual framework 
that links the performances observed in the health systems with key political and socio-
economic features in the SADC region. Chapter 4 provides the methodology for the 
investigation of the extent to which performance of the health system is affected by the political 
stability. The theoretical model is tested using a panel regression that combines data from 
different sources in the region. Chapter 5 presents the results and provides a discussion. 







Chapter 2: The SADC region 
2.1 Context 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a Regional Economic Community 
(REC) comprising 16 Member States; Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (formerly Zaire), Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa,  Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADC was 
established in 1992 with a commitment to regional integration and poverty eradication within 
Southern Africa through economic development and ensuring peace and security. 
 
This study looks at 11 of the 16 countries for 20 years, for the period 1996 to 2015, when all 
SADC countries were independent of colonial rule. The sample selection is largely motivated by 
the availability of data not only on political stability, but also on other socio-economic variables 
of interest such as democracy, economic growth, female literacy, etc. The data limitations 
restrict our sample selection and exclude Lesotho, Mauritius, Seychelles and Eswatini where 
there was missing data for most variables and there was no International Country Risk Guide - 
Political Risk Services (ICRG) data on political stability. This study exclusively makes use of 
annualized time series secondary data.  
 

















Angola 28.81 4101.47 56 52.67 2.2 unstable unstable 
Botswana 2.25 6360.14 43 64.49 22.2 stable stable 
Congo, D.R. 78.74 456.05 58 59.02 0.8 unstable unstable 
Madagascar 20.70 401.84 65 65.48 0.4 unstable unstable 
Malawi 14.39 371.99 84 63.8 9.1 unstable stable 
Mozambique 28.83 529.24 68 55.37 10.5 stable unstable 
Namibia 2.48 4673.57 53 64.92 13.3 stable stable 
South Africa 55.91 5718.24 35 57.44 19.2 stable stable 
Tanzania 55.57 878.98 68 65.49 4.7 unstable unstable 
Zambia 16.59 1304.88 59 60.79 12.9 stable stable 
Zimbabwe 16.15 924.14 68 59.16 14.7 unstable unstable 






 In the SADC region, voting patterns are not purely determined by the policies of the candidates, 
other factors like ethnicity, coercion and allegiance to liberation parties determine voting 
behaviour. These other factors have contributed to political instability in the region. Former 
liberation parties like Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, English: Party of the 
Revolution), Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA), the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia and the 
Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) are among ruling parties that 
freed their countries from white minority rule and are not very tolerant of any form of political 
opposition (Chiroro, 2006). Officially, the parties may support multi-party systems and 
democracy, but their treatment of political opponents has been less than supportive. This is 
usually a cause for political clashes and radical policy changes resulting in political instability. 
 
In terms of governance, colonial powers were democratic in their own countries but did not 
afford the same governance structures to their colonies. It is argued that the lack of democracy 
in African states during colonialism meant that the African revolutionaries sought support from 
the Chinese and Russian socialist and communist states post-independence (Bauer and Taylor, 
2005 p.3). This meant that the newly independent African countries adopted the principles of 
communism and socialism from their supporters. The premise is that the principles on which 
socialist and communist states are founded require one party dictatorship to ensure successful 
implementation of socialist and communist policies, hence the resultant form of governance that 
is seen in most SADC countries where government criticism is not tolerated. In 2015, Amnesty 
International reported crackdowns or restrictions on political protests in Angola, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, successfully suppressing freedoms of expression and assembly 
(Amnesty International, 2015). Botswana however, is typically cited as one of the most 
democratic countries in Africa, with a history of peace and stability and democratic elections 
since its independence in 1966 (Bauer and Taylor, 2005). 
 
Within the region, there are some countries that are democratic but these countries have their 
own sources of political instability. Malawi became a multiparty democracy in 1994 after the 
autocratic rule of Kamuzu Banda belonging to the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) since 1964 
(Bauer and Taylor, 2005 p.12). The country however slipped back into autocracy after 2008 




government and corruption increasing. Democracy was however restored after his death in 
April, 2012. Zambia gained independence in 1964 and declared a one party system in 1972 
where President Kenneth Kaunda ruled unchallenged until the riots and protests and 
subsequently a failed coup in 1990. The country moved to a multi-party system in 1991. There 
was another failed coup in 1997 and just before the 2001 elections; there were political protests 
in response to proposed changes to the constitution for presidents to have more than two terms 
(Bauer and Taylor, 2005 p. 13).  
 
South Africa however, has always encouraged a multiparty democracy since its independence 
and its constitution has always supported this. The country however suffers from economic and 
social ills that stem from the apartheid era such that they have one of the highest inequality 
gaps in the world with a Gini coefficient of 0.69 (World Bank, 2014). These socio-economic 
problems and discontent result in periodic strikes and protests for better service delivery with 
the worst having been the Marikana incident in 2012. In addition to this, South African 
government officials including the former President have faced charges of corruption and 
misuse of public funds. Finance ministers were also known to lose their jobs if they criticized the 
former President’s use of public funds further aggravating political instability (Karodia and Soni, 
2016). According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2016), the 
failure to improve corruption perception indices by SADC countries like South Africa, Tanzania 
and the DRC, demonstrates how electoral democracy is challenged in African countries 
because of corruption. 
 
Another product of colonialism that affects politics is the premise of inferiority and backwardness 
of the local Africans that colonisers employed to justify systematic segregation of the natives. 
This resulted in close ethnic bonds among those who spoke the same language or lived in the 
same geographic area. For example, ethnicity was used as an apartheid weapon in Namibia 
and South Africa, through the “homeland” policy. The ethnic structure was used to ensure 
subordinate participation by Africans, ethnic consciousness was the tool of apartheid oppression 
(Young, 2002). African societies are often characterised by persistent deep-rooted and identity-
related conflicts. These conflicts are fueled by a combination of identity based factors and wider 
perceptions of economic and social injustice regarding the distribution of economic, social and 
political resources within the country (Harris and Reilly, 1998). When it comes to politics, the 
perception is that the winning candidate will convey benefits to his home area or to people from 




electoral outcome can take on a winner-take-all quality, and defeat is seen as unacceptable. 
The election campaign itself may be accompanied by physical violence and intimidation, raising 
the stakes for everyone. The possibility that competitive elections may lead to violent ethnic 
confrontation also emerged as a justification for single party or military regimes.  
 
The Angolan national liberation movement split into three mutually hostile movements: The 
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). The 
movements were demarcated both by different ethnic and racial bases, and by the distinct 
mission attachments of their leadership (Ndumbe and Cole, 2005). One of the most important 
reasons for the civil war that lasted 27 years in the country after independence was the 
reluctance of the dominant liberation movements to share power within a multi-ethnic society. 
Mozambique had a similar situation with FRELIMO and RENAMO creating civil unrest in 
Mozambique. Other examples in the region include Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU. The 
two political parties were separated on ethnic terms. In 1987, there was a civil war between the 
Ndebele in Matebeleland (ZAPU) and the Shona (ZANU). Following this, the two political parties 
signed the Unity Accord to merge under ZANU- PF and establish a one party state (Chiroro, 
2005). The Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) is one of the most ethnically diverse 
countries in the world, which has led to conflict for resources and power. Poor public service 
provision and control of mineral rich areas by rebels, certain ethnic groups, political powers or 
foreign institutions has resulted in poverty in the region and fuels violence and conflict behaviour 
(Karbo and Mutisi, 2012).  
 
An important characteristic to note about the SADC region is the political interconnectedness 
among the countries. The liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
and South Africa had to resort to armed struggle to attain independence (Bauer and Taylor, 
2005 p.7). These struggles for independence fostered interconnectedness among the states of 
the region. Many of those fighting for independence in their own countries spent time in exile in 
neighboring countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, which had gained their 
independence first. These countries became havens and training grounds in the 1970s and 
1980s for liberation movements that were attempting to end minority rule in South West Africa 
(Namibia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South Africa (ibid.). This relationship has continued post-
independence with the agreement among SADC countries that they will assist each other in 




country would directly impact the other SADC countries (SADC, 2010).  A case in point was the 
second Congo war of 1998 – 2002 where Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent troops to fight 
the Rwandan and Ugandan rebels that had entered the DRC. In addition to the economic 
effects on the countries that were actively involved in the war, other countries in the region also 
experienced stagnation in their economies (Koyame and Clark, 2002). 
2.2 Health in the region  
2.2.1 The HIV/ AIDS pandemic  
 
An analysis of health in the SADC region would be incomplete if it did not include the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic because Southern Africa is the worst affected region in the world (WHO, 2015). In 
2007, Southern Africa recorded the highest prevalence of HIV and AIDS with at least one-third 
of all HIV infected people globally and yet the region had less than 2% of the global population 
(Halperin et al, 2007). Attributed to this were high levels of multiple and concurrent sexual 
partnerships by men and women, coupled with insufficient consistent and correct condom use. 
In addition, low levels of male circumcision were identified as key drivers of the epidemic in the 
sub-region (ibid.). Infection rates among adults in South Africa, Swaziland, Botswana and 
western Kenya ranged from 20% to at least 30%, which was much higher than anywhere else in 
the world, outside of Africa (UNAIDS, 2006). However, the low levels of male circumcision do 
not explain why HIV has spread so much more extensively in Southern Africa than in India or in 
Europe, where circumcision is similarly uncommon.  
 
In addition, Demographic Health Surveys and other studies suggest that, on average, African 
men typically do not have more sexual partners than men elsewhere (Wellings et. al, 2006). A 
comparative study of sexual behaviour, conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
the 1990s, found that men in Thailand and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil were more likely to report five 
or more casual sexual partners in the previous year than were men in Tanzania, Kenya, 
Lesotho, or Zambia. And very few women in any of these countries reported five or more 
partners a year (Carael 1995 and Halperin, 2004). Men and women in Africa report roughly 
similar, if not fewer, numbers of lifetime partners than do heterosexuals in many Western 
countries.  
 
This leads to the notion that more than socio-economic determinants of HIV are the only factors 




developing countries. Despite the current best efforts of the international community in  
mobilising for HIV treatment, commitment on the part of national governments to negotiate with 
pharmaceutical companies over patented antiretroviral drug prices, their policy towards 
compulsory licensing, and the approach they adopt to delivering ART are the key determinants 
of the trajectory of the HIV epidemic. The economics of antiretroviral (ARV) drug delivery in 
developing countries is a political-economy discussion of access to treatment. For nearly 10 
years, the South African government’s response to the HIV epidemic was described as 
denialist, which was estimated to have resulted in the deaths of 330,000 people because 
lifesaving antiretroviral therapy was not provided (Chigwedere et al., 2008). 
2.2.2 Trends in the health outcomes 
 
The trends in life expectancy are increasing over time. Countries such as Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Angola have been experiencing a steady increase in life expectancy over time 
while those that were hardest hit by the AIDS pandemic saw a decrease in life expectancy 
between 2000 and 2005. In that time, countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland 
rolled out Anti-Retroviral Treatment (ART) to all HIV positive patients and the life expectancy 
started to improve. The pandemic affected maternal mortality as well as infant mortality but the 
trends in those two outcomes are steadily decreasing over time for all countries. The HIV 
incidence for all countries is also falling at an exponential rate. 
Figure 2.1 Trends in Life expectancy 
 




Figure 2.2 Trends in Maternal mortality ratio 
 
       Author’s construction from the data 
 
Figure 2.3 Trends in Infant mortality rate 
 





Figure 2.4 Trends in HIV incidence 
 















Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Measures of political stability used in the literature 
 
To examine how political stability influences policy choices and public health outcomes, the 
starting point is measuring political stability. Reliability of the measurement of political stability 
remains a key issue in any empirical study. A reliable measure must be able to quantify the 
frequency and the depth of political stability and be comparable over time and across countries. 
The literature uses measures such as the Polity IV (Radu, 2015), World Bank World 
Governance Indicators (Makuta and O’Hare, 2015; Farag et al, 2013), the International Country 
Risk Guide’s Political Risk Services (PRS) indicator (further on referred to as ICRG), the Major 
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions 1946-2015 database and the State 
Fragility Index (SFI) from the Centre of Systemic Peace. The World Bank World Governance 
Indicators index (further on referred to as WB) is a composite measure as it is based on several 
other indexes from multiple sources including the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World 
Economic Forum, and the International Country Risk Guide Political Risk Services, among 
others (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2006). The construction of a composite index reduces the bias of 
any one index that comprises the weighted average. The underlying indices reflect the likelihood 
of a disorderly transfer of government power, armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social 
unrest, international tensions, terrorism, as well as ethnic, religious or regional conflicts. Alesina 
and Perotti (1996) construct an index of political stability based on multivariate principal 
component analysis (PCA) based on the number of political assassinations, political arrests and 
attempted assassinations, coups, guerilla actions and the share of GDP that is spent on military 
spending. A similar methodology was used by Ndokang (2015). 
3.2 How political stability affects health 
 
The role of institutions is central to this discussion. The effect that political stability has on 
institutions affects the resultant economic and health outcomes. Figure 3.1 shows the 
hypothesized linkages between health and political stability and the economic growth 
intermediate steps. The diagram shows the complexity of the relationship and the feedback 
within the system where political stability can directly influence health and economic growth but 





Figure 3.1 Hypothesised linkages between health and political stability 
 
 
3.2.1 Political instability and economic growth 
 
Early work on political instability simply assumed that stability has instrumental economic value 
but this was never tested (Goldsmith, 1987). Rather, causes of political stability were mapped 
and stability was never used to predict economic performance, let alone health outcomes. 
Researchers believe stability to be a necessary condition for growth and prosperity because 
people are encouraged to invest and trade when they are confident in the future. Few things 
seem more likely to undermine business and consumer confidence than the prospect of political 
unrest and sudden changes in the political economy (ibid.). Early studies of growth, find that the 
number of revolutions and coups has a great effect on investment, which in turn influences 
growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Many authors have worked on the impact of a political crisis 
(Radu, 2015, Tabassam et. al., 2016, Aisen and Veiga, 2010) in a state with almost the same 
conclusion: political instability adversely affects the economy of a state and the proposed 
adverse effects are diverse in manner. Economic growth and political stability are 
interconnected. On one hand, the uncertainty associated with an unstable political environment 
may reduce investment and the rate of economic development. On the other hand, poor 
economic performance may lead to government collapse and socio-political unrest. Posner 




political stability. Aisen (2011) finds that higher degrees of political instability are associated with 
lower growth rates of GDP per capita. Regarding the mechanisms, they find that political 
instability adversely affects growth by lowering the rates of productivity growth and, to a less 
extent, physical and human capital accumulation.  
 
Other studies have also found effects of political instability on inflation (Edwards, 1994). With 
regards to private investment, Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that socio-political instability 
generates an uncertain political-economic environment, which raises the risks of investment 
thus reducing the level of investment (foreign and domestic). An example here is the financial 
crisis in South Africa as a result of cabinet shifts. After six reshuffles of Jacob Zuma’s Cabinet 
including three finance ministers in 5 days in 2015, the economy deteriorated (Karodia and 
Soni, 2016). The Rand has been volatile since, falling to R16 against the USD, a reaction to 
political developments. The country’s bonds have also been downgraded to junk status resulting 
in capital flight (ibid.). 
 
Political instability also leads to higher inflation as shown in Aisen and Veiga (2006). The 
channels of transmission at work to explain inflation in their paper, similarly affect economic 
growth - political instability shortens the horizons of governments which disrupts long term 
economic policies that are conducive to better economic performance. Holt and Turner (1966) 
sum up the political basis for economic development as follows: war, revolution, and other 
destabilizing events obviously disrupt economic activities in the short term, but, Olson argues, 
they also set the stage for more rapid growth in the medium term. Over the long term, however, 
Olson asserts that political stability can be economically dysfunctional and cause growth to 
decelerate (Olson, 1982). 
 
3.2.2 Economic growth and health 
 
A global empirical study showed that governance, education and private sector and trade were 
found to be the most important macro factors associated with maternal mortality (Sajedinejad et. 
al., 2015). Employment and labor structure, economic policy and debt, agriculture and food 
production, private sector infrastructure investment, and health finance were also some other 
critical factors that explained about 65% of the variability in maternal mortality between different 




Studies highlight a unidirectional causality that exists between healthcare expenditures and 
GDP (Hansen and King 1994; Blomqvist and Carter 1997; Gerdtham and Loethgren 2000; 
Herwartz and Theilen 2003). Studies in OECD countries show that GDP per capita is the most 
important determinant of healthcare expenditure and that healthcare expenditure increases 
proportionally more than per capita income (income elasticity above unity). Such findings may 
help to understand variation in health expenditures encountered between different regions of the 
world. Income is related to health in, at least three ways: through the gross national income of a 
country, the income of individuals, and the income inequalities within nations (Marmot, 2002). 
This would suggest that a redistribution of income will improve health and therefore its 
outcomes. Economic growth implies better food and housing, access to safe water and 
sanitation, less strenuous working conditions and fewer people living under destitute conditions 
(Bloom and Canning, 2000). Figure 3.2 shows the positive relationship between life expectancy 
at birth and real GDP per capita, a one-year improvement in a population's life expectancy 
contributes to an increase of 4% in output (Bloom et. al., 2004). This supports the notion that 
income improves lifestyles therefore reducing citizens’ propensity to protest (political instability).  
 
Figure 3.2 Income and Life Expectancy Across Countries 
 
                                                                     Adapted from Weil, 2013 Data Source: World Bank 
 
Interestingly, we observe a few SADC countries that are outliers. The DRC and Zimbabwe lie 
above the line of best fit meaning that life expectancy in those two countries is higher than the 




fall below the line meaning that their life expectancy at birth is lower than the average country 
with the same income level. This alludes to the presence of other factors affecting life 
expectancy beyond income. For example, South Africa and Botswana have high rates of HIV. 
Gbesemente and Gerdtham (1992) noted that countries in Africa, unlike OECD countries have 
an income elasticity of healthcare expenditure of unit. This means that a unit increase in income 
in OECD nations results in an increase in health expenditure of more than 1 unit in OECD 
nations and by 1 unit in African states. This study helps to explain the differences in the effect of 
income on life expectancy, the same income level does not necessarily translate to the same 
expenditure on health in African countries as in OECD countries. This study, among other 
African studies (Okunade, 2005; Murthy and Okunade, 2009; Gbesemente and Gerdtham, 
1992) also revealed that countries receiving more foreign aid, invest more in healthcare. The 
positive correlation between foreign aid and per capita healthcare expenditure is of particular 
interest. It reinforces the view that in countries with limited resources, increased foreign aid is 
essential for higher allocation of resources to the health sector and provision of other public 
goods.  In addition to these determinants of health expenditure, health personnel per capita and 
internal conflicts also explain variations in health expenditure in Africa (Okunade, 2005). Foreign 
aid flow is determined by the political and institutional stability of a country. Deviations from 
stability could result in a loss of aid that would have been beneficial to the economy including 
the health system. 
3.3 Political instability and health 
3.3.1 Effects of political instability on the health system 
 
There are different channels through which political instability affects public service delivery in 
general and health outcomes in particular. Channels range from a fall in income due to high 
unemployment that emerges from crisis to non-respect of rule of laws that secures returns to 
economic investment. The empirical evidence shows that many of the cities that experience civil 
disorders have low and inefficient health service outlooks (Somali-Swedish Action Group for 
Health Research and Development, 2014 and Cocks, 1999). More generally, one expects 
political instability to not only influence political decisions, but also economic as well as social 
dimensions. Some previous studies account for productivity losses that are associated with 
political instability (Dupas and Robinson, 2012). This loss in productivity, in turn, reduces the tax 






Political instability creates a threat to existing institutions by enhancing the level of uncertainty 
that surrounds public and private investments as well as the risks that are associated with long-
term government decisions. During periods of political instability, ministry staff turnover is high 
and this results in the lack of stability in decision-making processes, especially in the developing 
world, where the structures of the current institutions provide little accountability for a coherent 
governance structure. The effects on government decisions are discussed further in the next 
section on public financing. 
 
If the legitimacy of the government is undermined, then the government’s capacity to formulate 
policy is reduced and they may fail to implement any long term plans. Uncertainty within the 
government can lead to patronage payments and corruption within the system in order for each 
individual to ensure they have a livelihood even after they leave power. Equally, some citizens 
could receive transfers to reward them for the support for the government rather than these 
funds being used for economic development. All these effects negatively affect health outcomes 
by affecting different parts of the public health system. Other effects that can be felt during this 
period are reduced domestic savings and investments, capital and donor funding flight and 
property destruction. NGO involvement in a country and the level of donor funding are largely 
dependent on political stability. Crisis nations receive emergency humanitarian assistance and 
economic/infrastructural recovery states get recovery phase assistance. Southern African 
nations have offices of donor agencies that implement and fund on-going projects and their 
continued work depends on political stability and a demonstrated commitment of local 
governments to ensure fiduciary stewardship. Countries like Zimbabwe and the DRC saw NGOs 
flee from them at the height of political unrest which disrupted programs in HIV/AIDS or 
Reproductive Maternal Neonatal and Child Health (RMNCH) which are currently the highest 
recipients of aid in countries like Zimbabwe (MOHCC, 2016). 
 
Beyond governments, political risks affect local citizens as well as international communities. 
Human events such as war and civil disruption directly affect health conditions in a country. For 
instance, increases in military spending may also compete with health care priorities (crowding 
out) such that there is a consistently smaller budget allocation for healthcare investments. If 
instability includes physical destruction of infrastructure like roads and public health 




impacted. Any refugees that result from this situation will increase the burden of need for 
healthcare in a nation where resources for healthcare will be dwindling (Ityavyar et al, 1989).  
 
A health crisis that is associated with political instability leads to a number of discrepancies, 
which might all negatively affect economic performance. War and civil disruption are usually 
proven to force both relocation and displacement of people (Ityavyar et al. 1989). This, in turn, 
places an increasing burden on the health services at the destination points. When the political 
systems are not strong enough to resolve these dynamics, this situation might lead to disease 
epidemics. In conflict zones, political violence might cause disruption and, as a result, a 
complete cut-off of services and assistance for the people left behind or the displaced persons. 
These effects have the potential for a downward spiral into chaos and possibly state of 
emergency. The ripple effect of the political scenario described above may be reduction in 
human capital due to deaths or brain drain. Studies show that many medical professionals 
(including doctors, nurses, pharmacists and lab technicians) have moved from politically 
unstable countries to the ones where their lives are not at risk (Squires et. al., 2016; Awases et. 
al., 2003; Bloom and Standing, 2001; Bundred and Levitt, 2000; Ndlovu et al., 2001; 
Bakamanume, 1998; WHO, 1997). This has the effect of reducing the stock of health service 
providers in situations where they are needed most.  
 
Ityavyar et al (1989) investigated the impact of incessant violence and conflict on health in 
Africa. The authors concluded that African states would have better health policies had they not 
experienced internal violence or political conflict. An additional driver of health-related 
investments is income. As an example, Bakamanume (1998) tracked the effect of political 
instability on healthcare in Uganda and he found that the greatest effects of political instability 
were seen in the trajectory of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The southern region with no conflict saw 
declining rates of HIV infection when the northern region in crisis saw increasing rates of HIV 
(Bakamanume, 1996 and 1997).  Ndokang et. al. (2015) discussed the adverse effects that 
political instability in the Central African Republic had on health in Cameroon validating the 
effects of political instability across borders as well. 
 
3.3.2 Mechanisms of transmission between political stability and health 
 
The next question to be answered is: What are the mechanisms by which ruling political parties 




main mechanisms of transmission seem to be via the effect of political instability on economic 
growth and income, then the effect of income on health expenditure and therefore the final 
effect on health outcomes. The main channels through which political stability affects health 
outcomes are: (1) the effects of political stability on institutions and governance, which in turn 
influence health services delivery, and (2), the effects of political stability on GDP and growth, 
which in turn influence health-related investments.  
 
3.3.2.1 Effect on institutions and governance 
 
Mismanagement, corruption and lack of clear policies to chart ways forward result in poor health 
outcomes. Policies, institutions, and processes at the micro and macro levels are inherently 
connected. Navarro et. al. (2006) find that cumulative years of pro-redistributive governance are 
statistically correlated with policies promoting full employment, highly regulated labour markets, 
and public health expenditure. Holmberg and Rothstein (2011) find that quality of governance is 
positively associated with higher levels of life expectancy and lower levels of mortality rates for 
children and mothers. Therefore, this assessment will need to incorporate micro-macro 
linkages, these being the linkages between issues that influence livelihoods and economic 
recovery at the individual, household, and community level (the micro level) and those issues 
that relate to the economy, policy framework, and systems of governance at provincial, national 
and, where relevant, regional levels (the macro level).  
 
Corruption is one form of poor governance that affects countries and is rampant in politically 
unstable countries. It is defined as the use of public office for private gains (Bardhan, 1997). The 
main forms of corruption are bribes received by public officials, embezzlement by public officials 
of resources they are entrusted to administer, fraud in the form of manipulating information to 
further public officials’ personal goals, extortion, and favoritism (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001). 
Large bribes paid to influence policy formulation and major contract awards tailored to favour 
private interests and those favours bought from bureaucrats and judicial officials involved in 
implementing existing policies in their daily interaction with the citizens of the country are the 
major forms that affect the economy and health outcomes. Given that corrupt behavior of public 
officials affects the cost and incentive structures faced by the firms and households, an 
explanation is given for how that affects the performance of an economy and health outcomes in 
this case. In 2006, the leading international anti-corruption organization, Transparency 




people’s access to health care and on health in general. The report documented lack of access 
to treatment due to corrupt practices. Corruption in this case took the form of drug pilfering for 
sale on the black market, health service provider absenteeism as they seek profitable 
opportunities outside of their jobs and stolen equipment for sale. Malfunctioning equipment in 
the public sector sometimes does not get replaced so that the health service providers can refer 
patients to their private practice where they offer the service privately for a profit. In some cases, 
low levels of treatment efforts are observed in some public health institutions and patients are 
referred to practitioners’ private practices for better care (World Bank, 2010: 2). 
 
Fragmentation of government structures adds to the bureaucracy involved in making decisions 
and any delays or inefficiencies in the processes could be political in nature. Public sector 
organizations and public officials at various levels of government are key players in the policy 
process. Civil servants and political appointees are deeply involved in policy formulation, 
regulatory agencies are delegated wide-ranging discretionary powers, and street-level 
bureaucrats crucially influence policy outputs and shape the public image of the government 
(Bach and Maggetti, 2017). Political instability results in uncertainties of government positions 
and policies alike which adversely affect policy implementation and institution credibility. 
 
Figure 3.3 Mechanism of how policy decisions are made 
 





Khan (2010) argues that higher-level formal institutions like the president or minister’s office are 
‘political’ institutions which define the rules for changing rules, and these rules define the 
‘political’ transaction costs of organizing changes in lower-level institutions. It should always be 
possible to suggest an introduction of growth-enhancing/health improving institutions because 
the additional output should enable losers to be compensated directly or indirectly, if the political 
transaction costs of negotiating the compensations are low. But if political institutions are 
inefficient or have divergent ideologies and political transaction costs are too high, the cost of 
introducing policy/programmatic interventions in lower-level institutions may preclude a rapid 
change to greater efficiency. In order to effect changes, political transaction costs need to be 
reduced. This can be done by other institutions namely; informal institutions through lobbying or 
NGOs who bring financing for interventions and can bypass the bureaucracy. Political instability 
could lead to the absence of other institutions like NGOs who flee the risk or weakness of 
existing public institutions. This can however limit the extent to which political transaction costs 
can be reduced. Good governance lowers transaction costs in the economy since citizens and 
companies will be able to predict the outcomes of their interactions with government authorities 
(North, 1990). 
 
In addition to the transaction costs involved in policy making which affects public health 
expenditure and programming, the study examines the other effects of poor governance on 
health outcomes. When people earn a stable income, they have the ability to save for the future, 
including adequate provision of public goods like healthcare and education for those with 
children. This results in the brain drain of key personnel like doctors and nurses in institutions 
that provide public health services. This reduces the labour force and poor health outcomes can 
arise from institutions being understaffed and the few that are present being demotivated. 
 
The same phenomenon applies to the linkage between political stability and health via the 
income route. Institutions and government policies provide the incentives for individuals and 
firms in an economy. For instance, Kaufmann (2003) finds that the slowing of economic growth 
rates of countries is not related only to the macroeconomic situation of certain countries, but 
also to the stagnation or the lowering of governance indicators such as the quality of the 
institutional structure, independence of the judiciary, level of corruption and the ease of doing 
business. Similarly, Roll and Talbott (2003) conclude that about 80% of differences in GNI per 
capita between different countries, can be explained by factors such as property rights, political 




from excessive bureaucracy, informal economy, trade barriers, etc. The same transaction costs 
that prevent progress in effecting interventions for health improvement apply to the situation 
where economic development is not fostered. However, it is important to highlight that, per 
capita income does not directly determine the production of health output rather, it permits a 
high level of expenditure for health purposes whether by the individual or by the government.  
 
An example is when health care is said to be free but due to economic hardships, is not. Some 
services require an administration fee to be paid before accessing health services. This blocks 
access to healthcare for those who cannot afford to pay the administration fee. This can be the 
result of instances where the government is expending resources for free healthcare but 
corruption erodes this endowment and patients are then asked to pay for services. If the 
resources intended for healthcare have been pilfered, then poor governance has fostered poor 
health outcomes.  
 
Another example is the case where the government declares free health services in order to buy 
political support but they cannot afford this. This would not be sustainable and would result in a) 
health service provider morale falling if the implications of lack of government funds are that 
their wages do not come on time or at all or b) the service provider charging for services in order 
to recoup costs or c) the service provider ceasing to offer services due to lack of resources. All 
three scenarios result in poor/ no health services being offered and therefore poor health 
outcomes. 
3.3.3 Political instability and public financing 
 
Economic literature has long recognized the influence of political process on efficiency in the 
provision of public goods (Deacon 2009). For instance, some empirical studies carried out in the 
OECD countries have shown the extent to which electoral motives influence public health 
expenditures (Potrafke, 2010). In a bid to garner votes, politicians invest in sectors such as 
health that affect all citizens and are usually under provided for and therefore provide a gap that 
can be filled. Potrafke continues to classify health as an important and special good whose 
expenditure decisions differ from other social goods. This is said to be the reason its provision 
depends on the type of governance structure and is higher in election years (Potrafke, 2011).  
Samuelson (1954) provided the optimal conditions for the provision of public goods. Provision of 




political and social regimes, the anticipated free-riding behaviors, reliability of institutions, etc. 
Health service delivery, acknowledged as one particular form of public service, is driven by the 
above-mentioned factors but also by the political systems that influence public finance. Whether 
under democratic or autocratic regimes, the provision of health services is deeply rooted into the 
political actions and incentive mechanisms taken by national governments. 
 
North (1990) said that “Third World countries are poor because the institutional constraints 
define a set of payoffs to political/economic activity, which do not encourage productive activity”. 
As a result, countries experience a decrease in public expenditures that could have improved 
health and other key socio-economic conditions due to weaknesses in institutions that result in 
increased incentives to use public funds for less productive activities. The supply of public 
goods reaches its efficiency when the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) in consumption of the 
different consumers remains equal to the marginal rate of transformation (MRT). The marginal 
rate of substitution is the rate at which a consumer can give up some amount of one good in 
exchange for another good while maintaining the same level of utility while the marginal rate of 
transformation is the rate at which one good must be sacrificed in order to produce a single 
extra unit (or marginal unit) of another good, assuming that both goods require the same scarce 
inputs. The optimality condition assumes not only that the market is under perfect competition, 
but also that individuals are able to share and monitor the costs that are associated with the 
provision of the public goods.  
 
Political instability affects both the MRS and MRT curves associated with public good provision. 
If the instability involves the military for example, then investment in defence crowds out other 
government investments e.g health expenditure. Citizens face different choices when a country 
is unstable to when it is not. They may choose to give up more health care in order to get 
security from the deployment of armed forces. However, if the crisis is bloody then they may 
need more forces and more health facilities. From the government’s perspective, they may 
choose to protect their position by getting more armed forces that do not necessarily benefit the 
population. In this case, the opportunity costs of healthcare expenditure increase and the 
intrinsic value of an extra unit of military increases, changing both the marginal rate of 
substitution and the marginal rate of transformation curves. An additional component to consider 
is the lack of imperfect information in this scenario where opportunity costs and intrinsic values 
cannot be fully observed by all the stakeholders. An alternative scenario is that costs do not 




themselves amidst turmoil. The externalities arising from the different scenarios are also difficult 
to quantify and include in the model to determine optimal quantities. Figure 3.4 shows the 
different scenarios that could arise and their effects on health provision assuming that health 
and defence are the only two public goods provided. 
 
Figure 3.4 Effect of political instability on public health provision 
 
Scenario A - Budget decrease as a result of                 Scenario B – Increased opportunity  
misuse of public funds                                                    costs of not investing in defence 
 
                                                                                                                       Author’s own construction 
Figure 3.4 Scenario A shows a budget decrease that results in a parallel inward shift of the MRT 
curve. The equilibrium that results from this shift is a small decrease in defence and bigger 
decrease in health. This results from the rate of transformation that already exists where the 
curve is steep – in order to provide an additional unit of defence, a lot of healthcare has to be 
foregone. Scenario B shows a change in opportunity costs of providing defence, changing the 
slope of the MRT curve which results in an increase in both goods provided. 
 
Lindahl (1919) showed that simultaneous bargaining allows individuals to determine the level of 
public good provisions as well as the distribution of the costs between them. The equilibrium 
that arises from the bargaining corresponds to the Pareto optimal outcome. However when 




there is a distortion between Samuelson (1954) optimum (social efficiency is maximized when 
the marginal costs are set equal to the sum of the marginal rates of substitution) `and the policy 
preference. Thus inefficiency can lead to either under provision or overprovision of public goods. 
Policy preference is assumed to be the outcome of heterogeneity observed between individuals 
(Persson and Svensson 1989; Aghion and Bolton 1990, Millner et. al. 2014).  When political 
regimes are introduced in the analysis, heterogeneity emerges from the differences observed 
between characteristics of the voters. Therefore one expects, as argued by the economic 
theory, that public good provisions under democratic societies would be efficient in a society 
with identical voters (for example, the same ethnic group). Tiebout (1956) shows that the 
influence of heterogeneity could be overcome when people organize themselves into 
communities. The underlying assumption for membership creation is to send a signal that 
reveals the group’s sensitivity towards existing public policies. This is however difficult in our 
case where diverse ethnicity is at the core of politics in the region. 
3.3.2.1 The effect of democracy 
 
Firstly, studies have shown that low-income democracies are at least as conflict/instability-prone 
as low-income non-democracies due to the prevalence of socio-economic strife in low-income 
countries (Herge and Nome, 2010). In a follow-up study, Hegre finds that when you control for 
GDP and other socio-economic conditions, democracies and non-democracies are just as likely 
to plunge into conflict (Hegre, 2014). Therefore democracies and non-democracies in low 
income countries are just as likely to plunge into political turmoil, which lends the discussion to 
focus only on the public provision choices of the different regimes.  
 
The link between political regimes and public good (health) provision has an intuitive 
explanation. In a dictatorship (democracy of a few/ the elite), where political influence is 
concentrated among a few, a rational government leader spends the public budget mainly on 
transfers targeted to politically influential groups. This can be classified as spending on an 
exclusive good that only a few benefit from. Alternative spending on a nonexclusive public good 
is deemed unprofitable because much of a public good’s benefit would spill over to non-
influential outsiders. In a democracy, where control of the government requires satisfying a large 
fraction of the population, direct transfers are unattractive because of the large size of the group 
whose support must be won dilutes the benefit each member receives. Spending heavily on the 




public good to a larger population. Authoritarian regimes tend to suppress political competition 
and have an interest in preventing human development. This is done because improved health, 
education, and economic security mobilise citizens to advocate for greater participation and 
more resources. However, the same conditions could secure a dictator’s position if the citizens 
have nothing to complain about. 
 
The provision of public goods under different regime sets has been investigated, both 
theoretically as well as empirically. The underlying rationale behind the questioning of political 
dynamics in health service delivery stems from the fact that voters can influence political 
decisions. In a democratic society, one expects voters to have more influence over public policy, 
than in an autocratic society. Acemoglu et. al. (2005) have provided the role of institutions in the 
provision of public goods. Additional studies have argued that dictatorships provide fewer public 
goods than democracies (McGuire and Olson, 1996; Niskanen, 1997). For example, Besley and 
Kudamatsu, (2006) argue that democracies provide more public health than autocracies and 
therefore health outcomes would be better in democratic countries than in autocratic ones.  
 
Arguments put forth for why democracy provides better public health than autocracies stems 
from its public provision servicing. It is usually expected from democratic societies to promote 
internal instruments that favour redistribution of income and assure that the poor receive at least 
basic healthcare services (Mobarak et. al., 2011). The assumption that a democracy is where 
the interests of the masses are represented in government assumes that public good provision 
caters for these masses. The opposite being an autocratic government that only caters for the 
elite/their supporters who form the minority. The repression of media and political opposition 
that typically characterizes autocracy is said to stifle public debate that could force a 
government to be accountable for the level of public good provision. This would result in a 
government that provides less than optimal public health but will never be openly criticized for it 
(Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006). Without elections, opposition parties, and uncensored public 
criticism, ruling groups do not suffer political consequences from their failure to prevent health 
crises. Democratic governments, by nature of being accountable and looking out for the 
masses, will pick skilled professionals to run ministries and public offices and the assumption 
following this is that their staff is more competent than those in autocratic public offices (Besley 
and Kudamatsu, 2006). Therefore, more competent staff deliver better services than those that 





There is however no consensus on the differences in public good provision and the type of 
government. Deacon (2009) found that democracies provide higher levels of public goods but 
Mulligan and Tsui (2006) argue that public policies have nothing to do with the level of political 
competition (interpreted as the degree of democracy).  Mulligan et al. (2004) expected to find 
that democracy affects policies that redistribute / economically favor the political leadership / 
enhance efficiency but instead they found that democracy correlated with policies that limit 
competition for public office. This means that the type of government did not affect choice of 
public good provision, rather policies designed to keep them in power. Therefore, political 
competitiveness may have little to no effect on a wide range of economic and social policies, 
like the mix of taxes, or spending on social security. Instead, competitiveness is reflected by 
policies like military spending, torture, and execution, which more directly serve to protect the 
incumbent leader’s position.  
 
Political instability arises from popular uprising against a government that needs to attend to a 
socio-economic or political problem. These problems can take the form of poor economic 
growth, poor health systems, trade sanctions, income inequality, ethnic inequality and tribal 
differences to name a few.  In an unstable democracy, the failure of public policies to resolve 
socio-economic problems results in political unrest which, in turn, will pave the way for a military 
or hostile takeover and the establishment of an authoritarian system (Pourgerami, 1988).  
 
The next Chapter will conduct empirical studies on the data to determine whether or not political 












Chapter 4: Methodology  
 
4.1 Demand for health capital: a simplified Grossman model 
 
Health outcomes can be seen as outcomes of a health production function. The health 
production function used in this paper is based on Grossman’s (1972) model of the demand for 
health. In this model, health is demanded for two purposes: consumption and investment. 
Health as an investment commodity is an important form of human capital. The core assumption 
of the model is that an individual inherits an initial stock of health capital that depreciates over 
time but can be increased through investment. Such gross investment is a function of a 
household’s health seeking behaviour that includes factors such as diet, frequency in physical 
activities, time spent in recreation amenities and quality of housing. An investment in health 
increases stock of health, which improves health outcomes such as longer life expectancy and 
reduced maternal and infant mortality (Grossman, 1972). This investment can be undertaken by 
both the individual and the national government. Therefore the study adapts the original 
Grossman’s model to socio-economic characteristics of the SADC region and includes, among 
the determinants of health, factors such as political stability, public health expenditure and the 
percentage of the population that lives in rural areas.  
 
Therefore the first specification of the means of our outcome is modeled by the following health 
production function in which a country’s health outcomes (H) depend on political stability , 
GDP per capita , public health expenditure per capita , a measure of a country’s 
democracy level  and a vector of other socioeconomic indicators . 
 
    (1) 
4.2 Model specification 
Let  be the health outcome  for country  at time , we proceed to build a regression 
equation with the socio-economic covariates as control explanatory variables resulting in 





    (2) 
 
Where  is a set of the socio-economic control variables (drawing from the literature, this 
includes the education, military spending, inflation, HIV incidence and the percentage of the 
population living in rural areas (inequality)), and  is the democracy variable,  the 
difference between countries which is constant over time,  the time specific random effect, 
and  is the regression residual.  
 
The fixed effects specification of the model is shown below: 
 
   (3) 
 
(the unobserved time-invariant country effect)  and  (the random error term) 
. 
The fixed effects model requires a specification of a correlation structure so we estimate the 
correlation structure from the data. The structure revealed by the data as shown in Tables A1 to 
A4 in the appendix show an autoregressive structure with values that are closer in time having a 
higher correlation than those further apart. Therefore an autoregressive correlation structure will 
be used to estimate the fixed effects. 
 
Equations (2) and (3) regress the health-related outcome (life expectancy at birth, maternal 
mortality ratio and infant mortality rates and HIV incidence) over key socio-economic and 
political variables. Equations (4) and (5) are the specifications of the random and fixed effect 
models respectively that investigate the determinants of public health expenditure,  
 
    (4) 
 
    (5) 
 
In the estimation of what influences of government health expenditure as a percentage of total 
government expenditure , the analysis uses the dynamic theory of public spending 




geographically-defined legislatures (Battaglini and Coate, 2008). The value of a public good is 
stochastic and it reflects shocks such as wars or natural disasters. The variables under 
investigation as potential determinants of public health expenditure, include political stability, 
democracy and inflation which erodes the value of any money that had previously been raised 
for public expenditure.  
 
Both the random and fixed effects models will be run five times for each of the four health 
dependent variables and for the public health spending variable that comprise  using the 
explanatory variables listed in section 4.3. However, depending on the dependent variable, 
some explanatory variables may not be significant or contribute to the variability in the response 
variable. The most explanatory parsimonious models will be built and interpreted. 
 
A comparison of each pair of the fixed effect and random effect models is done using the 
Hausman test. This is done in order to determine the cross specification of each dependent 





The Hausman specification tests show that the most fixed effects models were favoured over 
the random effects model with p-values< 0.10 therefore we reject  and use the fixed effects 
model. 
 
Besley and Kudamatsu, (2006) use a fixed effects panel study to investigate the relationship 
between health and democracy, while controlling for various factors. Farag et. al. (2013) use the 
same in order to estimate the effect of health expenditure on health outcomes. Ruhm (2004) 
and (2006) also suggests the use of a panel study rather than time series when investigating 
linkages between the economy and health outcomes as this provides more robust outcomes. 
Therefore, the next step is to build a panel study rather than conduct time series analyses.  
 
The main advantage of the fixed effects model is that it only uses within-subject variation, 
despite the fact that this can lead to lack of precision. Another major disadvantage is that 




do not change with subjects over time (Gunasekara et. al., 2014). However, time-invariant 
covariates may be interacted with time-varying exposures of interest, e.g. to investigate whether 
the effect of income on health varies by sex, poverty status or education level. There are no 
time invariant variables in this analysis. Similarly, fixed effects models are not useful for 
investigating the exposure-outcome association in respondents who do not change their 
exposure levels (e.g. the effect of persistent political stability on health), or appear in just one 
time period, because only observations where the exposure varies contribute to the fixed effects 
estimate (ibid.). All countries in the dataset have varying political stability scores on each index 
over time and the model uses the continuous variables rather than the classification so this 
disadvantage does not affect the results of the estimation. 
4.3 Data 
This study endeavours to explain the variation in a few health outcomes that capture various 
aspects of an economy. Life expectancy, maternal mortality rate, neonatal and infant mortality 
rates and HIV incidence are key health indicators that will be used as dependent variables 
capturing health outcomes. Regarding public health investment, the percentage of total 
government spending that is allocated to public health is the dependent variable in that model. 
Before imposing a particular methodology on the analysis, data exploration is done to determine 
the data characteristics and a method suggested based on the findings. The dataset is strongly 
balanced. 
4.3.1 Data Sources 
All data were extracted from World Development Indicators (WDI) with three additional political 
indices obtained from sources that provide data on democracy and political stability. WDI is the 
primary World Bank collection of development indicators gathered from officially recognized 
international sources. It presents the most current and accurate global development data 












Table 4.1 List of the variables data and its sources 
 
Data Source 
Health outcome variables  
Life expectancy at birth WDI - United Nations Populations Division 
Maternal Mortality Ratio annual estimates WDI - WHO Maternal Mortality trends 
Infant mortality rate WDI - WHO Levels and Trends in Child 
Mortality 
HIV incidence WDI - WHO UNAIDS estimates 
HIV prevalence WDI - WHO UNAIDS estimates 
Socio-economic variables  
Real GDP per capita WDI - World Bank national accounts data 
Consumer Price Inflation (consumer prices) WDI - World Bank national accounts data 
Public health expenditure (% of total health 
expenditure) 
WDI - WHO Global Health Expenditure 
Female Literacy WDI - UNESCO Institute of Statistics 
Political variables  
Political stability and absence of violence/ 
terrorism 
World Bank – World Governance Indicators  
Political stability and absence of violence International Country Risk Guide Political Risk 
Services 
Polity Polity IV 
 
In order to fully capture the effect of income inequality, the models used rural population instead 
of physicians per capita. The two variables are highly correlated and therefore rural population 














a) Life Expectancy at Birth 
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing 
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. It is affected 
by factors such as heredity, physical condition, lifestyle, nutrition, and occupation. 
 
b) Maternal Mortality Ratio 
Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while 
pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. This measure is 
widely accepted as a key indicator of health and socioeconomic development. 
  (6) 
 
c) Infant Mortality Rate 
Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths of infants under one year old per 1,000 live births. 
The probability that a child born in a specific year or period will die before reaching the age of 1 
year, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of that period, expressed as a rate per 1000 live 
births. This rate is often used as an indicator of the level of health in a country. IMR is calculated 
as: 
    (7) 
d) HIV incidence 
Number of new HIV infections among uninfected populations ages 15-49 expressed per 100 
uninfected people in the population in the year before the period. 
 
e) Public health expenditure 
Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central 
and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international 
agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance 
funds. For this study public health expenditure is expressed as a percentage of total health 
expenditure. Following from the Battaglini and Coate (2008) dynamic theory of public 




the elected officials is useful to determine the value of health in relation to all other government 
expenditure.   
 
Independent variables  
 
f) HIV prevalence rate 
This is defined as the percentage of the population living with HIV. Prevalence measures the 
frequency of existing disease in a defined population at a specific time.  
 
g) GDP per capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. The analysis will use the log of GDP values 
for easy interpretation. 
 
h) Inflation 
Inflation is measured by the consumer price index. It reflects the annual percentage change in 
the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed 





i) Female literacy rate 
Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can both read and write 
with understanding a short simple statement about their everyday life. Literacy rate is an 
outcome indicator to evaluate educational attainment. It can be also used as a proxy instrument 
to see the effectiveness of an education system; a high literacy rate suggests the capacity of an 
education system to provide a large population with opportunities to acquire literacy skills. 




health, nutrition and education of their household members. The variable is expressed as a 




The POLITY IV (2000) project from the University of Maryland calculates various measures of 
how a country is governed for 181 countries going back as far as 1800. For each year and 
country, a Polity Score is assigned which ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 being assigned 
to autocracies, -5 to 5 to anocracies, and 6 to 10 to democracies.  
 
k) Political stability 
 
The SFI data runs from 2005 and would limit the time on my dataset. MEPV documents major 
wars and armed conflict and would not fully capture the political instability that does not result in 
armed conflict like protests or high turnover of government officials. Therefore these two indices 
were not used.  The study uses the political stability index as published by International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) Political Risk Services (PRS) whose index comprises various attributes of a 
government and its neighbours. The study also uses the composite index WB WDI to check for 
the robustness of the ICRG estimates and to determine the sensitivity of the coefficients to 
measurement errors. Similar techniques of using two indices to check for robustness were used 
by Swaleheen (2009) and Altun (2016). Table 4.2 explains the definitions of the two indices 
used in this study.  
 
Table 4.3 shows a matrix of the 11 SADC countries in the panel and their political stability 
classification by each variable over the 20 year period. The indices do not classify countries as 
stable or unstable therefore this study uses a threshold of 0.7 for ICRG where countries scoring 
less than 0.7 for a particular year are classified as unstable and those scoring 0.7 and above 
are classified as stable. For the WB indicator, 0 is used as the cut-off point. Countries scoring 
above zero in a given year are classified as stable and those scoring below zero are classified 
as unstable. We denote s for stable and u for unstable. The variables were however included in 




Table 4.2 Definitions of the two political stability variables 
 International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) World Bank World Governance Indicator (WB) 
Definition This index between (0 and 1) is constructed by 
calculating a weighted average of the indices 
below: 
Government stability - A measure of both of the 
government’s ability to carry out its declared 
program(s), and its ability to stay in office. The risk 
rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents: Government Unity, Legislative 
Strength, and Popular Support. 
Internal conflict - A measure of political violence 
in the country and its actual or potential impact on 
governance. The risk rating assigned is the sum of 
three subcomponents: Civil War/Coup Threat, 
Terrorism/Political Violence, and Civil Disorder. 
External conflict - A measure of both the risk to 
the incumbent government from foreign action, 
ranging from non-violent external pressure 
(diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade 
restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to 
violent external pressure (cross-border conflicts to 
all-out war). The risk rating assigned is the sum of 
three subcomponents: War, Cross-Border Conflict, 
The index of Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. It is an index measured 
between -2.5 and +2.5 is a composite index of numerous 
political stability variables. 
Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire & Democracy Index 
- This variable includes, orderly transfers of power, armed 
conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest and 
international tensions / terrorist threat.  
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report - 
This reports the cost of terrorism.  
International Country Risk Guide - As defined already. 
Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and 
Political Terror Scale - Political terror scale. 
iJET Country Security Risk Ratings - Security risk rating  
Institutional Profiles Database - Intensity of internal 
conflicts: ethnic, religious or regional, intensity of violent 
activities of underground political organizations and intensity 
of social conflicts (excluding conflicts relating to land). 




and Foreign Pressures. 
Ethnic tensions - A measure of the degree of 
tension attributable to racial, national, or language 
divisions. Lower ratings (higher risk) are given to 
countries where tensions are high because 
opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to 
compromise. 
This index is made up of: 
Protests and riots - The risk that the nature and impact of 
protests and riots (excluding those related to labour) cause 
damage to assets or injure or detain people, particularly if 
these disrupt normal movement, business operations, and 
activity. 
Terrorism -The risk that the activities of any non-state armed 
group or individual cause (or are likely to cause) property 
damage and/or death/injury through violence. This risk 
definition includes terrorism, which uses violence (or the 
threat of) to advance a political cause, and similar tactics 
used by "for profit" organised crime. 
Interstate war - This risk measures resultant impacts 
(death/property damage) and means, covering the spectrum 
from targeted military strikes against limited targets to full-
scale war with the aim of changing the government and/or 
occupation. 
Civil war - The risk of intra-state military conflict, in the form 
of an organised insurgency, separatist conflict, or full- blown 
civil war, in which rebels/insurgents attempt to overthrow the 
government, achieve independence, or at least heavily 
influence major government policies. 





4.4 Exploratory Data Analysis 
 4.3.1 Trends in political stability 
Table 4.3 Country stability classification by {ICRG; WB}* 
Country Angola Botswana DRC Madagascar Malawi Mozambique Namibia S.Africa Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe 
Year 
1996 u; u s; s u; u s; s s; u u; u s; s s; u s; u s; u s; u 
1998 u; u s; s u; u s; s s; u s; s s; s s; u s; u s; s u; u 
2000 u; u s; s u; u u; s s; u s; u s; u u; u s; u s; s u; u 
2002 u; u s; s u; u u; u u; s s; s s; s u; u s; u u; u u; u 
2003 s; u s; s u; u u; s u; s s; s s; s s; u s; u u; s u; u 
2004 s; u s; s u; u u; s s; s s; s s; s s; u s; u s; s u; u 
2005 s; u s; s u; u u; u u; s s; s s; s s; u s; u s; s u; u 
2006 s; u s; s u; u u; s u; s s; s s; s s; s s; u s; s u; u 
2007 s; u s; s u; u s; s u; s s; s s; s s; s s; u s; s u; u 
2008 s; u s; s u; u s; u u; u s; s s; s u; s s; u s; s u; u 
2009 s; u s; s u; u u; u s; s s; s s; s s; u s; s s; s u; u 
2010 s; u s; s u; u u, u s; s s; s s; s u; u s; s s; s u; u 
2011 u; u s; s u; u u; u u; u s; s s; s u; s s; u s; s u; u 
2012 u; u s; s u; u u; u u; u s; s s; s u; u s; s s; s u; u 
2013 u; u s; s u; u u; u u; u s; u s; s u; u s; u s; s u; u 
2014 u; u s; s u; u u; u u; s s; u s; s u; u u; u s; s u; u 
2015 u; u s; s u; u u; u u; s s; u s; s u; u u; u s; s u; u 




Table 4.3 shows the classifications of each of the SADC countries under observation in this 
study. Angola was mostly unstable according to the ICRG index with stability from 2003 to 2010 
before returning to instability. The WB index classified Angola as unstable for all the years. 
Botswana was classified by both indices as being politically stable from 1996 through 2015. 
Conversely, the DRC was classified by both indices as being politically unstable throughout the 
period of observation as a result of the civil strife in that country with rebel insurgences and the 
assassination of President Kabila. Madagascar was classified as stable by both indices in 1996 
and 1998 which was followed by differences in stability classification between the two indices. 
The country was however classified as unstable from 2009 till 2015. Malawi also has mixed 
classifications by the two political stability indices with concurrence from 2008 where both 
indices classified the country as unstable followed by two years of stability then three years of 
instability then non-concurrence.  
Mozambique was generally classified as stable after instability in 1996. In the last three years, 
the ICRG index classified the country as stable but the WB index classified the country as 
unstable. Namibia was classified as stable by both indices in all years except in 2000 when the 
WB index classified the country as unstable. South Africa and Tanzania have similar stability 
rankings by both indices without concurrence in most years. Both countries are classified as 
unstable in the last two years. Zambia was mostly stable with instability in 2002 during the 
drought. Finally, Zimbabwe was reported as unstable for most of the period under observation 















4.4.2 Summary statistics 
 
Table 4.4 Summary statistics for each country for 1996-2015 
Country
Variables Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Life expectancy 48.20 42.50 52.67 56.76 48.61 64.49 53.85 49.00 59.02
Maternal mortality 734.20 477.00 1120.00 237.50 129.00 338.00 813.80 693.00 920.00
Infant Mortality 117.64 96.00 132.30 45.30 34.80 53.10 94.85 74.50 113.80
HIV incidence 0.23 0.19 0.25 2.15 0.94 4.68 0.12 0.03 0.23
HIV prevalence 1.83 1.10 2.20 24.15 22.20 26.00 1.52 0.80 1.90
GDP per capita 2460.72 421.38 5327.15 4930.59 2854.67 7504.85 263.75 100.69 456.05
Inflation 279.36 7.28 4145.11 7.84 3.06 12.70 112.91 1.63 513.91
Public health expenditure 58.80 42.41 72.26 58.96 42.41 72.26 22.63 3.09 47.11
ICRG political stability 0.69 0.51 0.75 0.84 0.76 0.91 0.44 0.23 0.54
WB political stability -0.89 -2.31 -0.23 1.02 0.87 1.11 -2.23 -2.84 -1.98
Polity -3 -6 -2 8 7 8 -3 -8 5
Angola Botswana Congo, D.R. 
 
Country
Variables Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Life expectancy 61.08 55.43 65.48 51.13 43.56 63.80 51.07 46.56 55.37
Maternal mortality 485.30 353.00 612.00 735.30 613.00 952.00 758.55 489.00 1100.00
Infant Mortality 55.13 35.90 83.10 76.34 43.40 119.50 91.54 56.70 138.30
HIV incidence 0.05 0.02 0.10 1.17 0.38 2.30 1.22 0.71 1.52
HIV prevalence 0.44 0.30 0.60 13.43 9.10 16.70 9.46 4.80 11.20
GDP per capita 342.62 243.57 472.38 307.26 149.37 524.31 393.43 214.73 623.20
Inflation 9.49 -1.22 19.76 18.65 7.41 44.80 10.15 1.48 48.49
Public health expenditure 51.07 42.39 61.73 53.41 27.38 73.96 59.53 42.74 70.31
ICRG political stability 0.67 0.58 0.76 0.68 0.59 0.89 0.79 0.69 0.86
WB political stability -0.21 -0.98 0.62 -0.03 -0.45 0.12 0.14 -0.51 0.63




Variables Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Life expectancy 59.06 54.11 64.92 55.12 51.56 60.61 56.57 48.75 65.49
Maternal mortality 335.05 265.00 391.00 113.35 60.00 154.00 665.20 398.00 944.00
Infant Mortality 42.96 32.80 49.40 46.45 33.60 54.70 60.26 35.20 93.80
HIV incidence 1.54 0.68 3.29 2.12 1.30 3.54 0.54 0.21 0.98
HIV prevalence 15.21 11.40 17.40 18.50 10.30 21.00 6.48 4.70 8.00
GDP per capita 3591.04 1716.90 5679.88 5054.38 2518.40 8049.95 523.32 217.48 957.93
Inflation 5.74 2.28 9.45 6.03 1.39 11.54 9.02 4.74 20.98
Public health expenditure 59.60 43.46 73.33 44.14 39.97 48.62 51.52 39.14 69.40
ICRG political stability 0.85 0.79 0.89 0.71 0.65 0.79 0.74 0.66 0.80
WB political stability 0.71 -0.25 1.20 -0.13 -0.54 0.22 -0.36 -0.85 0.09
Polity 6 6 6 9 9 9 -1 -1 -1













Madagascar has the highest mean life expectancy of 61 years even though the whole dataset 
has a narrow range of between 40 and 66 years with an average of 53.65 years. Higher mean 
life expectancy is in Namibia, Botswana and Tanzania, all of which are mostly politically stable 
countries. Maternal mortality is highly variable with a minimum of 60 in South Africa and a 
maximum of 1120 in Angola. Infant mortality is much lower in comparison to maternal mortality 
with a maximum of 138.30. HIV incidence ranges from as low as 0.02 to 4.68% with 
corresponding HIV prevalence ranging from 0.3 to 26%. As far as GDP per capita goes, 
economic prosperity in the SADC region ranged from $149 in Malawi to $8050 in South Africa 
showing the vast differences in income in the region. Extreme values of inflation go as high as 
24 411% in Zimbabwe where prices increased multiple times a day and as low as -1.22% in 
Madagascar. The percentage of government expenditure allocated to health ranges from 3% to 
74% resulting in different health outcomes.  
 
The ICRG political stability variable is between the {0; 1} bounds as stated by PRS with a 
minimum of 0.23 and a maximum of 0.91. The dataset shows the minimum value of the World 
Bank political stability variable as 2.84 yet the index is said to be between -2.5 and +2.5.  
The next section shows two-way plots of each of the dependent variables and the explanatory 
variable of interest - political stability. The continuous data of the two political stability indices 
over the 20 year period are used in order to establish a relationship between each of the 
dependent variables and political stability (profile analysis). The key question is to determine 




Variables Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Life expectancy 50.56 42.02 60.79 46.78 40.68 59.16
Maternal mortality 391.55 224.00 598.00 524.65 369.00 657.00
Infant Mortality 72.11 43.30 106.10 58.20 46.60 63.50
HIV incidence 1.32 0.85 1.92 1.66 0.88 3.74
HIV prevalence 14.27 12.90 15.80 19.24 14.70 26.00
GDP per capita 928.46 330.22 1839.52 610.47 327.20 931.20
Inflation 16.90 6.43 43.07 1496.46 -2.40 24411.03
Public health expenditure 49.26 41.17 58.00 37.28 7.43 62.30
ICRG political stability 0.76 0.61 0.89 0.63 0.44 0.78
WB political stability 0.27 -0.28 0.66 -0.99 -1.52 -0.46





Table 4.5 Pearson Correlation matrix between political stability and health outcomes for 
each country  
Country Polstab index Life expectancy MMR IMR HIV incidence Public health expenditure
Angola ICRG; WB 0.36; 0.94 -0.40; -0.95 -0.13; -0.83 0.41; -0.15 0.05; 0.49
Botswana ICRG; WB -0.75; 0.31 0.73; -0.33 0.79; -0.32 0.56; -0.24 -0.41; 0.43
Congo, D.R. ICRG; WB 0.46; 0.61 -0.53; -0.69 -0.45; -0.60 -0.49; -0.64 0.53; 0.66
Madagascar ICRG; WB -0.70; -0.71 0.71; 0.74 0.67; 0.72 0.35; 0.32 -0.56;-0.54
Malawi ICRG; WB -0.54; 0.26 0.66; -0.64 0.73; -0.55 0.71; -0.53 -0.57; 0.74
Mozambique ICRG; WB 0.07; -0.11 -0.13; 0.08 -0.18; 0.02 0.43; 0.41 -0.21; -0.36
Namibia ICRG; WB 0.35; 0.59 -0.25; -0.38 -0.18; -0.56 0.06; -0.46 -0.03; -0.32
South Africa ICRG; WB -0.47; -0.54 -0.40; 0.73 0.59; -0.34 0.12; -0.81 -0.50; 0.50
Tanzania ICRG; WB -0.24; 0.55 0.23; -0.54 0.19; -0.54 0.27; -0.49 -0.03; -0.28
Zambia ICRG; WB -0.11; 0.64 0.09; -0.69 0.13; -0.67 0.12; -0.65 -0.62; -0.13
Zimbabwe ICRG; WB 0.37; 0.70 -0.37; -0.68 -0.25; -0.56 0.31; 0.26 -0.30; -0.16
All countries ICRG; WB 0.13; 0.32 -0.42; -0.58 -0.29; -0.50 0.45; 0.40 0.52, 0.55  
                                                                                              Author’s own calculations from the data 
 
Mozambique and Namibia have a few significant associations between the health outcomes and 
the political stability indices. For these countries there is also very little variability in the political 
stability indices and the health outcomes.  
 
Life expectancy has a significant positive relationship with political stability for within country 
data but not for the full dataset. As political stability improves, life expectancy increases. 
However in Madagascar and South Africa, life expectancy has a strong negative correlation with 
political stability because their life expectancy was increasing over time despite a decrease in 
political stability. Table 4.5 is supported by the two–way scatter plots below that show the 
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Maternal mortality rate and infant mortality rate are significantly negatively correlated according 
to the World Bank political stability index in most countries and overall. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 also 
show these relationship patterns. 
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Figure 4.2 shows a negative and linear relationship between political stability and maternal 
mortality ratio. 
 













.2 .4 .6 .8 1












-3 -2 -1 0 1
WBPolstab
 
ICRG                                                                     WB 
Figure 4.3 shows a negative and linear relationship between WB political stability and infant 
mortality rate. 
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Figure 4.4 shows a positive and exponential relationship between political stability and HIV 
incidence. Politically stable countries have higher HIV incidence. This may be unique to our 
dataset as noted in the profile analysis. In the dataset, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana 
have the highest HIV incidences and they also have the least political instability. These 
countries account for the extreme on the right of the graph. 
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Figure 4.5 shows a positive and linear relationship between political stability index and public 
health expenditure. 
 
Before embarking on the exercise of model building, we test for multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables. This is done so that we do not include variables that are highly correlated 
































Gvt public health expenditure 0.09 1.00
WB Political stability 0.47 0.59 1.00
ICRG Political stability 0.41 0.43 0.93 1.00
Polity 0.56 0.14 0.06 -0.10 1.00
Military expenditure -0.50 0.06 0.09 0.18 -0.29 1.00
Inequality -0.85 -0.85 0.28 -0.03 -0.68 0.54 1.00
Health expenditure per capita 0.93 0.07 0.28 0.15 0.64 -0.58 -0.88 1.00
Female Literacy 0.89 0.19 0.44 0.33 0.52 -0.44 -0.81 0.87 1.00
HIV prevalence 0.91 0.13 0.52 0.42 0.58 -0.53 -0.73 0.83 0.71 1.00  
 
From this table 4.6, log GDP per capita is highly correlated with health expenditure per capita 
which is intuitive. Increased income results in increased expenditure on health. Inequality is 
negatively correlated with the health expenditure per capita and the log of GDP. The higher the 
rural population, the lower the GDP and therefore lower per capita health expenditure. Female 
literacy as a proxy for education is highly correlated with inequality and health expenditure per 
capita.  
Other things being equal, an independent variable that is very highly correlated with one or 
more other independent variables will have a relatively large standard error. This implies that 
the partial regression coefficient is unstable and will vary greatly from one sample to the next 
(Allen, p.176, 1997).   The presence of the multicollinearity here has no impact on the estimation 
of the model coefficients for the main variables of interest, political stability since the political 
stability indices do not correlate highly with any of the independent variables. The statistical 
significance of the primary relationship being studied here will therefore not be affected.  
 
So this type of collinearity can simply be ignored. The two political stability variables are highly 
correlated between themselves but they are not correlated with the other variables, therefore 
the effect of political stability will be accurately measured due to this.   
4.5 Data Quality and Methodology Limitations 
 
Data quality in a country is dependent on a certain degree of political stability. Data may be 
unreliable or missing in years of political instability. Data quality in Africa is deemed to be poor in 




is not very good. According to the UNESCO education data quality assessment exercise (2014) 
data quality, accessibility and integrity are especially weak and should be strengthened in 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Variables such as military spending are 
missing 46% of the values of the required 220 observations.  They have been dropped from the 
analysis despite their importance. Overall, more data points would have given better estimations 
of the effect parameters but the age of the SADC states imposed a restriction on when the first 
data points could be obtained. The late independence of Namibia (1990) and South Africa 
(1994), pushed the earliest possible year for the panel study to the mid 1990’s. Important 
variables like the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality were excluded from the analysis 
due to difficulty in obtaining the variable and this was substituted by the percentage of the 


























Chapter 5: Results and Discussion 
 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are controlled for in all the models and robust estimates 
of standard errors are obtained. Results for the log of health outcomes are presented in Table 
5.1. All analyses were run using the ICRG political stability variable in one instance and the WB 
WGI political stability in another to explain the health outcomes. This allows us to account for 
differences observed in measuring political stability variables as highlighted earlier. 
 
Furthermore the analysis tested for endogeneity in all the models calculating the correlation 
between the X variables and the error term and the results for each model are listed in Table 
5.1. There is no endogeneity in any of the models. All the models are significant with F-test p-





With p-values less than 0.01, we reject  and conclude that all the models are valid.  





5.1 Empirical results and Interpretation 
 
5.1.1 Political stability and health outcomes 
 
As mentioned earlier the regressions are run for each of the selected health-related outcomes. 
Model 1 uses the ICRG political stability index and Model 2 uses the WB WGI political stability 
index. ICRG political stability is statistically significant in explaining all the health outcomes and 
the WB WGI political stability is significant for the infant mortality and HIV incidence only. We 
control for HIV prevalence due to the harmful effects that the pandemic had in the SADC region 




significant in explaining all the health outcomes, it has a negative effect on health outcomes 
while GDP, education and political stability have a positive effect. Higher incomes in stable 
environments promote longer lives. Controlling for inflation and the unemployment rate in 
addition to income did not improve the model. The two additional variables were not significant 
in any of the models and when they were added, income also became insignificant. Therefore 
the two economic variables have been left out of the health outcome models. The democracy 
measure polity was not significant in explaining any of the health outcomes but was significant 
in explaining the variability in public health expenditure.  
5.1.1.1 ICRG political stability index (Model 1) 
 
Holding all other variables constant, when the ICRG political stability index increases by 1 unit 
(more stability), life expectancy increases by 0.19% (p-value < 0.05), maternal mortality ratio 
decreases by 1.37% (p-value <0.01), infant mortality rate decreases by 2.01% (p-value <0.01) 
and HIV incidence decreases by 3.48% (p-value <0.1).  GDP was highly significant in the 
models built for the health outcomes, countries with higher GDP have better health outcomes. 
When other covariates are held constant, the income elasticities of life expectancy, maternal 
mortality ratio, infant mortality rate and HIV incidence are 0.29% (p-value<0.01), -0.36% (p-
value<0.01), -1.13% (p-value<0.01) and -2.05% (p-value<0.01) respectively. A percentage 
increase in HIV prevalence resulted in a 0.03% (p-value<0.01) decrease in life expectancy, a 
0.1% (p-value<0.001) increase in the maternal mortality ratio, a 0.02% (p-value<0.01) increase 
in infant mortality and a 0.1% (p-value<0.01) increase in HIV incidence. Government health 
expenditure was not significant for maternal mortality and HIV incidence. The health investment 
elasticity of an additional percent of government investment on life expectancy is -0.002% (p-
value<0.01) and -0.01% for infant mortality (p-value<0.001). Controlling for GDP per capita 
reduces the effect of government expenditure when public health expenditure was in the model 
without controlling for income. 
 
5.1.1.2 WB political stability index (Model 2) 
 
Holding all other variables constant, when the WB political stability index increases by 1 unit 
(more stability), infant mortality rate decreases by 0.27% (p-value <0.01) and HIV incidence 
decreases by 0.40% (p-value <0.1).  Similar to what was previously observed, GDP was 
significant in all the models for the health outcomes. When other covariates are held constant, 




incidence are 0.30% (p-value<0.01), -0.32% (p-value<0.01), -1.34% (p-value<0.01) and -1.92% 
(p-value<0.01) respectively. A percentage increase in HIV prevalence yielded the same 
coefficients as those obtained from the use of the ICRG index. Government health expenditure 
was only significant in explaining HIV incidence, the health investment elasticity of an additional 
percent of government investment on HIV incidence is -0.03% (p-value<0.01. Similarly, 
controlling for GDP per capita reduced the effect of government expenditure or made it 
insignificant depending on the health outcome. All standard errors are small suggesting very 




Table 5.1: Fixed effects model coefficients with robust errors for health outcomes 
 
Response variable 
Log Life expectancy 
Log Maternal 
Mortality Ratio 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
HIV prevalence 
-0.026*** -0.026*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.022*** 0.024 0.106*** -0.093*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.017) (0.027) (0.050) 
Log GDP 
0.292*** 0.303*** -0.357*** -0.323*** -1.126*** -1.340*** -2.050*** -1.929*** 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.122) (0.188) (0.067) (0.103) (0.296) (0.289) 
Political stability 
0.194** 0.003 -1.369*** 0.015 -2.014*** -0.266*** 3.477* 0.402* 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.478) (0.140) (0.203) (0.073) (1.854) (0.189) 
Female literacy (Education) 
0.002*** 0.002** -0.002 -0.004 -0.005*** -0.004 0.006 -0.014** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 0.006 
Government public health 
expenditure 
0.002*** -0.0001 0.005 0.013 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.006 -0.031*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 
3.59*** 3.29*** 6.65*** 5.35*** 5.56*** 8.04*** 5.93*** 8.50*** 
(0.126) (0.092) (0.359) (0.800) (0.119) (0.468) (1.679) (1.187) 
F-statistic 222.92*** 435.5*** 491.11*** 330.15*** 3082.82*** 71.15*** 24.59*** 46.09** 
R-squared (within) 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.82 0.95 0.87 0.82 0.75 
Corr(e, x):Testing 










5.1.2 Political stability and public health expenditure 
 
The results for this section are shown in Table 5.2. In trying to explain the effect of political 
stability on the decision to allocate public funds to health, holding all else constant, a 1 unit 
improvement in political stability results in an increase of 0.31% (p-value<0.01) in public health 
expenditure when using the ICRG index for political stability. The alternative WB measure is not 
statistically significant. A percentage increase in GDP has an elasticity of 0.31% (p-value<0.05) 
on public health allocation for ICRG estimation and 0.33% (p-value < 0.1) when the WB 
measure is used. Inflation reduces public health spending by 0.01% when it increases by 1 unit. 
This is intuitive because inflation erodes the value of money. Countries with higher education 
levels allocate higher percentages to public health, 0.01% (p-value<0.05) increase for both 
political stability measures. This may be due to the increased demand for health services and 
government accountability by an educated population. The data show that democratic countries 
allocate greater portions of the budget to health than non-democracies. A unit increase in the 
polity index, results in an increase of 0.02% (p-value<0.01) in public health expenditure when 
using the ICRG index holding all other variables constant.  
 
The use of the WB index results in no significance of the inflation and democracy variables. 
When military expenditure is added to the model, it is significant and political stability ceases to 
be significant because of the high correlation between political stability and military expenditure. 
Adding health outcomes like HIV prevalence or life expectancy to try and explain public health 
expenditure did not yield a significant result due to multicollinearity among the explanatory 














Table 5.2: Fixed effects model coefficients with robust errors for health investment 
Response variable 
Gvt. public health 
exp. (% of total gvt 
exp.) 
  



















F-statistic 92.33*** 14.69*** 






Following from the results, political stability is seen to be a significant determinant of health 
outcomes and public health provision. The results are in line with previous findings observed in 
the literature. Sedda (2015) finds political instability as an important factor determining the 
success of the malaria elimination programming in African countries where conflict destroys the 
infrastructure that is intended to reach sick patients. Using rather a qualitative approach, 
Ghobarah (2004), Dupas and Robinson (2012) and Wise (2015) argue that countries with 
political instability have bad health outcomes. The results also show the effect of income on 
health outcomes. The income elasticity of life expectancy, maternal mortality ratio, infant 
mortality rate and HIV incidence are 0.29% (p-value<0.01), -0.36% (p-value<0.01), -1.13% (p-
value<0.01) and -2.05% (p-value<0.01) respectively. But these effects are higher than those of 
public health expenditure. This dissertation finds a statistically significant relationship between 
the percentage that the government allocates to public health and health outcomes but it is a 
negligible coefficient of 0.001% improvement after controlling for national income, education and 
political stability. Farag et al. (2013), Makuta and O’Hare (2015) also find this result when 
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controlling for governance for which political stability is sometimes used as a proxy. Rajkumar 
and Swaroop (2008) find that public spending has virtually no impact on health and education 
outcomes in poorly governed countries. This is relevant for policy in developing countries, where 
public spending on education and health is relatively low, and the state of governance is often 
poor (ibid.).  In a study involving eight East African countries, Bein et.al, (2017) find a strong and 
positive association between total healthcare expenditures and total life expectancy and a 
negative relationship between healthcare expenditures and the number of neonatal, infant, and 
under-five deaths. These findings have important implications for enhancing the development 
effectiveness of public spending. Filmer and Pritchett (1999) find that public health expenditure 
is statistically insignificant once they control for income per capita and other covariates. 
Wagstaff and Claeson (2004) treated public health expenditure as endogenous and found that 
there is not a statistically significant relationship between public health expenditure and health 
outcomes. Wagstaff and Claeson (2004) go on to mention that the link between public health 
expenditure and health outcomes could be strengthened by improving governance however the 
interaction term between political stability and public health expenditure did not yield any 
statistical significance in the models. The analytical framework by Mosley and Chen (1984) 
which incorporates social, economic, biological and environmental variables in the production of 
health is an extension of the health production function by Grossman (1972). They summarise 
the relationship between health outcomes and health spending to be: 
 
Socio-economic status → proximate determinants of health → risk of disease → health 
outcomes. 
 
This model suggests that the socio-economic inputs such as public health expenditure, income 
(GDP) and level of education do not directly impact health outcomes but affect health indirectly 
through proximate determinants which may explain the low levels of significance of the health 
investment on outcomes. 
 
Public health expenditure is explained by political stability, a country’s level of democracy, GDP 
and inflation. The literature does not have a lot of information on the effect of political stability on 
public health spending but there is more information on the effects of GDP and democracy.  Our 
results add to the literature and show that holding all else constant, a unit increase in political 
stability increases public health expenditure by 2.03%. Our results remain consistent with 
previous studies who identified GDP as the most important factor affecting public health 
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expenditure (Okunade, 2005; Murthy and Okunade, 2009; Gbesemente and Gerdtham, 1992). 
The school of thought that proffers a link between political stability and economic development 
finds that political instability negatively affects growth. (Feng, 1997; Zghidi, 2017) This suggests 
that the effect of political stability on health outcomes and investment may be direct and indirect.  
 
Democracies are argued to provide better public services (McGuire and Olson, 1996; Niskanen, 
1997; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006). The data show that the effect of a unit increase in polity 
yields 0.02% increase in public health expenditure. Health outcomes such as life expectancy 
and infant mortality have also been investigated in how they affect healthcare expenditure but 
these were not significant in the models ran in this research. This is consistent with the findings 
from other studies where the epidemiology of the region is incorporated as a covariate through 
various proxies. Lu et al (2010) used HIV sero-prevalence as a proxy for health and found that it 
had no significant relationship with general government health expenditure as a share of GDP. 
Murthy and Okunade (2009) found that maternal mortality rate had no relationship with health 
expenditure in African countries.  
 
Finally, different measures of political stability do not always yield significance in the model. This 
is largely due to the differences in calculating the two indices which shows the robustness of the 
estimates when there are measurement differences in the indices.                                              
 
5.2 SADC country specific mechanisms 
 
From Table 4.4, six countries are largely classified as unstable by both indices namely: Angola, 
the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
 
The DRC conflict left the country poor. According to the WHO (2006) report on rebuilding health 
systems in the DRC, poverty, displacement, limited access to health services and bad 
environmental health conditions were exacerbating the high vulnerability of the population to 
poor health. Health access is limited due to insecurity, poor logistics and infrastructure, lack of 
medicines and low level of training of health workers. In this case, the government was left with 
very little resources for public service expenditure. They faced a budget constraint of having a 
finite amount of money for development and this, coupled with a bigger budget for infrastructural 
replacement and then service delivery hence the poor outcomes there were a result of lack of 
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access. This is the same situation in Angola and Mozambique where more than 30 years of war 
completely destroyed infrastructure including health care centres and roads.  
 
The South Africa economic situation is the result of poor implementation of policy interventions, 
weaknesses in collective decision making and poor execution of policies and strategies, combined 
with the damaging effects of state capture and corruption. South Africa has suffered the effects of 
instability in the region (political or otherwise) and has seen an influx of refugees and economic 
migrants from countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, the DRC and even as far afield 
as Cameroon and Nigeria. This has put pressure on the health system where the country was 
already facing challenges to health access. Similarly, Malawi suffered from an influx of 
Mozambican refugees and that put pressure on already weak health resources. Malawi's 
experience with Mozambican refugees upset the stability of its health care system, burdening 
resources and leading to degradation of health care for Malawians and refugees alike (Feder, 
1998). Malawi and other African countries suffer from corruption that adversely affected the 
health system as funds allocated for public health were misused (Rispel, 2015). 
 
Governments need to rid the state of corruption, ensure policy consistency and certainty, promote 
macroeconomic stability, address weaknesses at public institutions, and ensure better use of public 
resources in infrastructure, education and health. The credibility of institutions is the biggest problem 
as a result of corruption and the economy does not grow enough to support the population. The 
public health sector is under-funded, mismanaged and neglected, a phenomena evidenced more so 
in the Eastern Cape but also seen in other provinces (Mayosi et. al., 2014). Post 2005, the 
availability of ARVs reduced mortality figures and improved life expectancy once civil society and the 
international community had put pressure on the government to fund HIV treatment. HIV incidence 
is a function of the investment in treatment because the lack of treatment means the HIV 
infected can easily spread the virus. In addition, lower national income results in higher poverty 
which leads to HIV risky employment becoming attractive thus also spreading HIV. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the late 1990s saw the country sending troops to the DRC. This cost the country 
money that was diverted from public sector provision. Subsequently, strikes broke out and 
political competition entered the scene.  This spiraled into political instability which resulted in 
unrest that led to the controversial land reform. The violent land reform was retaliated by 
international trade sanctions which saw a decline in the local economy due to lack of foreign 
currency and reduced public spending as government revenue fell. The poor health outcomes 
therefore resulted from lack of investment in public infrastructure, increased risk of disease from 
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dilapidated social infrastructure and poor nutrition from reduced income. Donor funding that had 
been playing an important role in the sector, fled at the height of political instability further 






















Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
Factors that distinguish health economics from other areas include extensive government 
intervention, intractable uncertainty in several dimensions, asymmetric information, barriers to 
entry, externalities and the presence of a third-party agent. Weakened institutions and poor 
governance due to political instability has been shown to adversely affect health investments 
and therefore outcomes. The effects of political stability on health outcomes require much 
attention and results from such studies could inform policies differently. The temptation is 
usually to place interventions in different areas that are suffering from specific illnesses without 
addressing the root of the problem. This will result in band aid solutions as opposed to long term 
problem solving approaches that address political and governance-related problems. This 
Masters dissertation investigates the extent to which political stability affects health outcomes. 
Our results found strong relationships between political stability and health-related outcomes 
(life expectancy at birth, HIV incidence, maternal mortality, infant mortality and investment in the 
health sector.  
6.2 Policy Recommendations 
 
Recognising the social determinants of health has become an important aspect of global health 
policy. What has been less recognised is how health services and outcomes affect political and 
social outcomes. This follows from the hypothesized linkages that are proffered in Chapter 3. An 
understanding of these linkages can help the government plan for health related investment with 
the end goal of having a healthy population and to avert political instability in the future.  
 
The health system can be seen as political currency. The population needs to be assured that if 
there is a health crisis, it can be addressed sufficiently by the government or an agent employed 
by the government. This assurance by the population brings political legitimacy to the current 
government as the outputs like a healthy nation and economic growth show the legitimacy of the 
government more than how they got into power. Therefore, consistency in public health 
provision, whether by a donor or another agent, could ensure that political instability does not 
arise from poor health outcomes. Beyond, political stability, this dissertation includes other 
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sources of political stability like inequality, ethnic divisions and political party infighting, and 
investigates the extent to which they affect health-related outcomes. 
6.2.1 Political stability, public financing and governance 
 
While comprehensive political stability and good governance are important goals, they cannot 
be seen as the only precondition for improved health outcomes. Provision of health services 
during periods of war may be difficult if not impossible. However, the areas experiencing the 
highest levels of maternal/neonatal mortality in Africa are mostly characterised by weak 
governance, corruption, lack of rule of law, civil conflict, degraded health infrastructure and 
insecure food supplies. These conditions can still allow for the provision of public goods as seen 
by the reduction in HIV incidence and decreasing mortality trends in all countries despite their 
political stability group as shown in the exploratory data analysis in section 4.1. This suggests 
that while good governance is helpful, the specific governance requirements of delivering 
healthcare may not require comprehensive governance capacity. Only specific technical 
interventions are necessary therefore this is a case of strategic rather comprehensive 
governance in which the minimal conditions of political stability and governance required for 
service delivery are met (Grindle, 2007).  
 
6.3 Directions for Further Research 
 
There is little information on the effect of political stability on health outcomes and health 
investment. The effect of wars has been documented but not subtle political instability as 
characterized by protests of government staff turnover. Health economics could benefit from 
multi-country longer time period studies on this relationship including intermediary relationships 
in order to assist with policy making in the health sector. The political economy of health is a 
important as the financial economics of health where nuances of politics and cultural norms 
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